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IPS by S. J. G. S. J. G. S. Date: 5/8/00

Other Agency Action: _____

NSC Meeting, July 19, 1961

- Tab 1 - Memorandum to Secretary from Mr. Kohler on the NSC Meeting July 19 ✓
- Tab 2 - Outline on Germany and Berlin (sent to the President July 18) ✓
- Tab 3 - Agenda, National Security Council Meeting July 19
- Tab 4 - National Security Council Action 2432
- Tab 5 - CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Possible Soviet Reaction to a Western Embargo"
- Tab 6 - Interdepartmental Coordinating Group Report in Response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 59 ✓
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NSC

TOP SECRETNSC Briefing, July 19, 1961Berlin

The Secretary opened the meeting by asking whether or not what the Department of Defense was requesting would fill the need: namely, for a force capable of taking care of any East German force and capable of sustaining itself at war for a few weeks against the Soviet army. The Secretary's general feeling was that Defense was not asking for enough.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that allied assistance and the calling up of reserves might fulfill both requirements. He added that Defense wants the money legislated and does not want to go into deficit financing. It was recently pointed out he added that the Department of Defense was not going to ask for a declaration of national emergency.

Mr. Chayes thought that a declaration of national emergency was not necessary; that the same ends might be obtained by legislation.

However, Mr. Kohler felt that the Congress, if asked for specific legislation in the absence of the declaration of national emergency, would be reluctant to pass that legislation and that Congress would point out that the President has the authority with the declaration of national emergency to call up the required number of men.

There ensued an exchange on how best to obtain the 500,000 men that the Army would require and the 18,000 Air Force specialists needed.

The Secretary then asked whether anyone knew whether Defense planned to bring up to full strength all our NATO units. The Secretary then left the briefing to call Mr. McNamara on this point.

Mr. Acheson pointed out what he called some of the mathematical problems, namely, we have seven reserve divisions, four are at full strength (the three STRAC and one Marine division); it would take four months to bring the other three divisions up to full strength. Without a change in the authorization it would be impossible to move more than three divisions. He pointed out that there were five divisions in Europe; that it had been deemed necessary to bring that to eleven divisions to accomplish the two-fold aspect of our military force in Germany; this could only be done by moving six divisions from the US. However, at no time was it deemed wise to have less than three divisions on ready stand-by basis in the US. There was no other answer but to call up three reserve divisions and it was his view that this could only be done by a declaration of national emergency.

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There was a further exchange of views by Mr. Kohler, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Chayes on whether or not a declaration of national emergency or legislative authority was necessary to accomplish the ~~necessary~~ build up.

The Secretary returned and said McNamara was coming over prior to the meeting of Principals to clarify these questions. He reported that Defense was going to require a 3.3 million budgetary increase but not a declaration of emergency, at least not before September 1, that six National Guard divisions could be mobilized, two each, January, February and March of next year. The Secretary said that he felt this was not prudent; that we needed greater forces much earlier.

Mr. Chayes maintained his point and also asked whether the three additional divisions ~~necessary~~, which would require either Congressional legislation or a declaration of national emergency, were in reality necessary in Europe. Mr. Acheson was quite firm on this point, eight divisions could not fulfill the two requirements: namely, holding East German forces and lasting for a couple of weeks against the Soviet forces.

The Secretary re-directed the conversation to the needs of this particular meeting: namely, what should be proposed to the President. He pointed out that the President expected by Tuesday to put his budgetary requirements before Congress. The Secretary also felt that it would be wise to inform the NATO Government of this move now rather than wait until the NATO Council. Mr. Kohler agreed. Mr. Kohler then passed out an outline on Germany and Berlin to the participants. This outline was returned to Mr. Kohler at the end of the meeting.

Mr. Cleveland brought up the problem of the migration of East Germans and the obvious discontent in that area. Mr. Kohler said that a memorandum on discontent in the East German area was being prepared but it should not be confused with the needs of today's NSC meeting.

Mr. Cleveland spoke forcefully on the fact that Soviet action was directed to jarring us loose from constructive action elsewhere such as our aid programs to Africa, et cetera. The Secretary questioned the premise of this argument. While it was true this might eventuate from the Soviet action in Berlin, he felt, it was only corollary to Soviet intentions in Berlin.

The Secretary then went on to the problem of stockpiles and Mr. Hillenbrand pointed out that the stockpile situation in Germany was very good with the exception of gasoline.

The Secretary asked whether he could have a schedule of the levels of the various items stockpiled. Mr. Hilsman stated that he would deliver that to the Secretary's office.

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With regard to the matter of going to the UN, Mr. Acheson took strong issue. He said it would be a very great mistake to go either into the International Court of Justice or the UN. Mr. Chayes agreed on the matter of the Court. In reply to Mr. Cleveland's question, Mr. Acheson said that he would not go into the UN because anyone who crosses a border is automatically on the wrong side. Mr. Cleveland maintained the point that we must set the stage rather than be dragged in before the bar as it were. Sooner or later we would be in the UN on this matter. Mr. Kohler added that even France, noted for its antipathy to the UN, had accepted the fact that there would be UN action on the Berlin situation sooner or later.

Mr. Martin raised the issue of the various economic sanctions noted in the paper prepared for this briefing for the NSC meeting. Mr. Cleveland said sanctions might be quite useful against East Germany and perhaps we should attempt now to put pressure on the East Germans given the state of discontent in the area. Mr. Martin pointed out that Yugoslavia, Switzerland and Sweden all provided loopholes in any blockade or sanction move.

Mr. Rusk asked to what extent we should pretend that everything is the same in our relations with the Soviet Union. Even though not effective, would not the breaking off of various negotiations under way at the present time and intensification of blockade or sanction moves prove that we were serious on Berlin. Mr. Acheson agreed that there was little enough we could do, but that we should indicate in some fashion that trouble lies ahead for the USSR if they persist.

After further exchange on this matter, Mr. Rusk indicated that a peace treaty with the East Germans and subsequent limitations of access to Berlin would not necessarily lead immediately to hostilities but would lead only into full mobilization.

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JUL 19 1961

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : EUR - Foy D. Kohler *FDK*
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting of July 19, 1961

1. The attached draft proposed NSC agenda was developed at a meeting this afternoon of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin. Mac Bundy will work it over for the President, but in its present form it will convey an idea of the range of decisions which should be made at the NSC meeting.

2. It was suggested that you might wish to open the meeting by making a general presentation of the U.S. approach to the Berlin problem as it has emerged during the continuous discussions of recent weeks, drawing on the paper entitled "Outline on Germany and Berlin."

3. With reference to the specific agenda items, the following may be noted:

a. Secretary MacNamara will present the Defense Department recommendations embodied in Annex A of the collection of documents prepared by the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group in response to NSC action memorandum No. 59 of July 18, 1961. In essence, he will recommend that a budget supplement for additional Fiscal year 1962 obligational authority be requested in the amount of 4.343 billion dollars. This supplement could be reduced to 3.384 billion dollars in the event it is decided to exclude the cost of mobilizing four Army and one Marine Reserve division and 60,000 Naval Reservists. It should be pointed out that either of these alternatives, in the view of the Department of Defense, will require a Presidential declaration of Limited National Emergency or Congressional action by September 1.

b. With reference to economic counter-measures, the recommendations page on the top of Annex B of the collection of documents prepared by the Inter-Departmental Coordinating

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Group sets forth four specific points for Presidential decision. Once this is obtained, the way will be cleared for our approach to the Allies on this subject.

c. You will want to obtain general Presidential approval for the political program set forth in Part IV of the "Outline on Germany and Berlin" as the basis of a U.S. approach to our Allies during the next weeks, culminating in the four-power Ministerial meeting which you will attend early in August. You will also wish to obtain a Presidential nod for the tactics to be followed in consulting with our Allies outlined in Part V of the "Outline on Germany and Berlin."

d. On the question of access procedures to be followed if GDR officials replace the Soviets at the access checkpoints, you may wish to indicate that, while there is need for an urgent decision on this point, further clarification of the issue involved is required before a recommendation can be made.

Attachment:

Proposed NSC Agenda.

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PROPOSED NSC AGENDA

1. Military Preparations
 - (a) Budget request
 - (b) Legislative authority, taxes, etc.
 - (c) Authorization of immediate measures.
2. Substance of our approach to allies on economic counter-measures.
3. Substance of our approach to allies on political program, including:
 - (a) General lines of review of contingency planning in political and psychological fields.
 - (b) Negotiating posture toward Soviets.
4. Tactics of consultation with allies concerning 1, 2, and 3 above.

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OUTLINE ON GERMANY AND BERLIN

1. U.S. Interests

- A. The vital interests of the U.S. (i.e., interests which involve decisions as to war) are engaged in the German-Berlin problem at the following points:
 - 1. Presence and security of Western forces in West Berlin.
 - 2. The security and viability of West Berlin.
 - 3. Physical access to West Berlin.
 - 4. The security of the Federal Republic of Germany against attacks from the East.

- B. The U.S. also has important political interests and aims in Germany which have not yet been realized. These may be summarized as the application to all of Germany of the principle of self-determination and the intimate association of a unified Germany with the West. The key importance of Germany's integration into Europe and thus into the Free World security pattern dictates that the United States could not accept reunification at the price of the "neutrality" of Germany. This has been consistent U.S. policy since the early post-war years.

- C. There are aspects of the German-Berlin situation which are not politically acceptable and are not likely to be changed in the near future, aspects which are not the occasion for a resort to force by the West. Among these are: (a) the de facto division of Germany, and (b) the de facto absorption of East Berlin into East Germany.

- D. Certain elements of the German-Berlin problem are of little national interest to the U.S., and could be conceded if it becomes valuable to do so, for example, the recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as a German-Polish frontier.

- E. A major U.S. interest cutting across all of these is maintenance of Allied unity and the strengthening of NATO.

II. Soviet Objectives

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II. Soviet Objectives

While precise Soviet objectives within any specific time period must be somewhat speculative, the resumption of Soviet pressures against the status quo in Germany and Berlin appear to be aimed at:

- A. The actual and formal consolidation of the Communist position in Eastern Europe and East Germany: Khrushchev has reason to be anxious about his situation in East Germany and the longer run prospect in such countries as Poland.
- B. Freezing of the division of Germany and development of the GDR as a base from which to mount the campaign to communize West Germany.
- C. Political steps to meet what might be a growing Russian concern about the revival and rearming of the Federal Republic of Germany.
- D. A significant dilution of the Western position in West Berlin, looking toward its absorption into a Communist East Germany.
- E. The weakening or dissolution of NATO.
- F. A blow to Western, and more particularly, U.S. prestige as a part of the general strategy of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

NOTE: The priorities Khrushchev might attach to the above are also related to factors of timing, for example, he may be seriously concerned with A, B, C, and D, as matters for immediate attention, but may look upon E, and F, as useful bi-products if they could be achieved. The fact that West Berlin as it is today makes the achievement of A, and B, difficult, if not impossible, apparently plays an important role in Soviet thinking and in terms of pressures which the GDR leadership can bring to bear.

III. The Political Problem

The central political problem is to protect U.S. vital interests, I.A. above, without war if possible and to put the U.S. and the West in the best possible position if war should become necessary. This will require:

- A. Action on a broad front to convince Khrushchev of U.S. and Western determination to defend these vital interests at all costs.

B. National

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- B. National unity based not only upon a clear public recognition of the issues involved but also upon confidence that every reasonable step has been taken to defend vital interests by measures short of war.
- C. Allied unity, based upon Allied recognition of their own vital interests - reaching beyond a readiness to follow the leader. Further, Allied unity must also rest upon confidence that the Allied position is reasonable and that the aggressor is forcing the issue beyond a tolerable point.
- D. Maximum support of world public opinion to make aggressive moves by Khrushchev as costly as possible in other areas in which he is interested.

IV. Actions Prior to September 17

- A. Initiation of a significant build-up of U.S. and Allied military strength of a type which can be continued for a protracted period. This should include, in the U.S., additional military appropriations now, of approximately \$3 billion and authority to call up Reserve and National Guard elements as needed. Also required are substantial civil defense measures. If possible, these should be accomplished without the atmosphere of National Emergency or Mobilization during this period.*
- B. Strengthening the position of West Berlin to sustain an interruption of access. (Airlift and stockpile)
- C. Seek Allied reconsideration of proposals to Soviets to submit legal question to ICJ, (which they vetoed on initial reply to Soviet Aide-Memoire), possibly in response to next Soviet communication; explore with them possible Western initiative to convene a Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting in early October to prepare a peace treaty for Germany, with the Germans to be invited as in 1959. (Western proposals at this stage to be based on self-determination along the lines of the Western Peace Plan.)
- D. Rapid Allied review of Berlin contingency plans in light of U.S. program.
- E. Rapid completion of Allied plans for imposition of wide range of nonmilitary countermeasures, including economic sanctions, upon interruption of access to Berlin, and for their more limited use in early stages to serve as warning and deterrent.

*The question of a national emergency must be reviewed in the light of a study received from the Defense Department this afternoon.

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- F. Special propaganda and covert activities aimed at Russian people, Eastern Europe, and East Germany.
- G. Decide whether Western Powers should take initiative in presenting their case to UN Security Council and General Assembly in order to head-off possible action in UN by neutral countries and to maintain control of situation.
- H. Undertake informal discussions with Soviet leadership, through our Ambassador in Moscow, in effort to probe Soviet position, to warn of possible consequences their position in terms Allied military build-up and to take advantage of any opportunities which might appear to move towards subsequent understanding on an arrangement which might be acceptable to us, such as Solution C, after Soviets have signed peace treaty with the GDR.
- I. Continuous consultation with Allies, using mechanism of Four-Power Working Group, and at higher levels as appropriate, on Berlin negotiating position and completion of Berlin Contingency Plans. This would be initiated in Washington immediately, and be followed by intensive Four-Power Working Group session during last week of July as preliminary to Western Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference to be held in Paris in early August. (See Section V for detailed schedules of Allied consultations.)
- J. Initiate and maintain consultation with Congressional leaders.

Actions After September 17

- A. If Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference to be held, complete Allied preparations.
- B. If decision taken for initiative in UN, action in General Assembly could be taken anytime after September 19 when that body convenes.

(At this point timetable becomes somewhat elastic. If Big Four Conference takes place, either some basis for arrangement on Berlin will emerge on it or it will not. If it does, this may lead either to a Soviet call for a peace conference or to a further round of exchanges with the Soviets. We must prudently assume, however, that the Soviets will now proceed to call their peace conference.)
- C. Carry out with our Allies agreed steps as response to Soviet call for a peace treaty. At present time these include intensified political and propaganda campaign involving representations to countries invited and to the Soviet Union.

D. If covert program

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- D. If covert program is approved, commence coordination of covert and semi-covert action designed to cause instability in East Germany and other Eastern European countries.
- E. If despite breakdown of Four-Power Conference, Soviets pause and do not call peace conference, decision will have to be made in light of circumstances as to whether, after further diplomatic exchanges, the time were not propitious for serious East-West negotiations in the light of the possible indications that the Soviet Union would now be receptive to such negotiations.
- F. If the Soviets call a peace conference, the decision would then have to be taken as to whether the U.S. should proceed with the mobilization of reserves and other measures proposed by the Department of Defense in alternative (A) of NSC Action Memorandum No. 59 of July 14, 1961.

V. Schedule of Allied Consultations

- A. As soon as US decisions are reached their general purport would be conveyed to President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer in letters from the President.
- B. These decisions would be communicated in greater detail to the French, British and German Governments through the Ambassadorial Steering Committee in Washington. Discussions would begin and directives agreed as appropriate on a tripartite or quadripartite basis would be sought to reactivate and guide the work of:
 - 1. The Allied working groups in Washington on general aspects of the question, non-military countermeasures and psychological and propaganda programs.
 - 2. The quadripartite group on economic countermeasures.
 - 3. The Live Oak group under General Norstad in Paris on military measures.
- C. Following these initial consultations which would thoroughly familiarize the four Allied Governments with US purposes, beginning about July 27 intensive tripartite and quadripartite consultations would be undertaken at a senior official level with

experts in

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experts in Europe, probably Paris, to survey and coordinate so far as possible the entire range of military, political, economic and psychological measures.

- D. The Western Foreign Ministers would meet in Paris August 4 - 8 as appropriate on a tripartite and quadripartite basis to review the state of preparations, settle outstanding problems and issue directives for further work.
- E. About August 8 one or all of the Western Foreign Ministers would make an interim report to NATO and seek other member countries' views on the state of preparations.
- F. August 8 - - -, the senior officials groups would continue for some days as required to carry out directives of the Foreign Ministers.
- G. Hopefully this course of consultations would result in an agreed revised contingency paper requiring governmental implementation and further work and consultation through the established machinery.
- H. Further progress reports would continue to be made to NATO and further special and intensive consultations could be arranged as determined by the Ambassadorial Steering Group in Washington. Depending on the development of the crisis, Western Heads of Government meetings might be desirable on tripartite, quadripartite or all-NATO basis.

July 18, 1961

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